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Abstract
We estimate a negative binomial model with fixed effects to examine the impact of spatial differences 
in environmental regulation on manufacturing capital flows. Using a newly available data set, we 
find that stricter air quality standards with respect to ozone deter births of polluting plants, 
suggesting that heterogeneity in regulatory standards may create a spatial browning process. We also 
find that spatial differences in environmental regulation do not play a role in the location decision of 
plants that are not pollution-intensive. Finally, we also examine the effects on capital flows with 
respect to three other criteria air pollutants regulated under the amendments to the Clean Air Act. 
We find that births of particulates-intensive manufacturers are deterred by stricter regulation with 
respect to particulates emissions but the location decisions of plants that emit high levels of carbon 
monoxide and sulfur dioxide are not significantly affected by increased regulation of the respective 
criteria pollutant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, environmental 
regulation control was in the hands of state and local authorities. Opponents of local 
control over environmental regulation argued that this created a ―race to the bottom‖ 
phenomenon where local legislators had incentives to set sub-optimum environmental 
regulatory standards in an attempt to attract polluting industries to the area. The 
decentralized status of air quality regulation and rising ambient concentration levels led 
to Congress creating administrative bodies such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality to enforce new regulatory 
statutes. The EPA created national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the 
newly formed National Environmental Policy Act and amendments to the Clean Air Act 
(CAA), designed to clean up source emissions for air pollution in the United States. 
Since then, an academic debate has emerged regarding whether a relationship exists 
between federal air quality regulations and the capital flows of pollution-intensive 
manufacturing plants. The intuition behind the debate is that if spatial heterogeneity in 
environmental regulatory standards creates significant differences in private compliance 
costs, then these costs should be factored into a firm‘s location decision. As such, 
pollution-intensive manufacturers may be deterred from opening new plants in areas 
with stricter regulations. Much of the earlier research suggests that, at most, any 
relationship between environmental regulation stringency and the location decision of 
pollution-intensive births is negligible (see Bartik, 1988; McConnel and Schwab, 1990; 
Duffy-Deno, 1992; Jaffe et al., 1995; and Levinson, 1996). However, more recent work 
specifically considers the impact of the CAA on the capital flows of pollution-intensive 
manufacturers and typically finds that increased regulatory standards deters pollution 
intensive births (see List et al., 1999; Becker and Henderson, 2000; List, 2001; List, 
McHone, and Millimet, 2004a; Becker, 2005). 
Under the CAA, each year every county in the U.S. is designated as being either in-
attainment or out-of-attainment with regard to federal air quality standards for each of 
six criteria pollutants. The six criteria air pollutants are tropospheric ozone (O3), 
particulates (PT), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 
and lead (Pb). Under the CAA, new plants are subject to significantly different start-up 
costs dependent on the attainment status of the county. Firms locating new plants in a 
county designated as being out-of-attainment are subject to the Lowest Achievable 
Emission Rate (LAER) on equipment. Regulatory compliance is enforced without any 
cost consideration to the firm and can entail significant start-up costs. These costs can 
comprise additional capital expenditures on air pollution abatement (APA) equipment 
and/or operating costs on new staff or more expensive materials. In contrast, firms 
locating new plants within in-attainment counties are subject to a less restrictive 
regulatory standard known as Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD). In this 
case, only firms that have the potential to emit more than 100 tons of a criteria pollutant 
(Class A polluters) in a year must install the Best Available Control Technology (BACT), 
where the cost burden on the firm is taken into account in the decision making process. 
Further, low-polluting firms are not subject to regulatory standards in areas designated 
as in-attainment. Overall, local regulators have discretion in the methods they choose to 
bring non-attainment areas into attainment as they target ―dirty‖ industries; however, it 
is the firms themselves that are directly regulated, not the industries. 
 
For an example of the recent work examining the firm behavioral impacts of the CAA 
and NAAQS non-attainment status, Becker and Henderson (2000) consider 
manufacturing plant location from 1963 to 1992 and find that ozone air quality 
regulations significantly reduce the number of births of high emitters in non-attainment 
areas relative to attainment areas. List and McHone (2000) use county-level annual 
ozone attainment status as their measure of air quality regulation and consider county-
level plant births in New York State from 1980 to 1990. They find that a county‘s ozone 
status change from attainment to non-attainment does significantly reduce births of 
―dirty‖ plants. Further, Kahn (1997) finds 14 percent lower growth in manufacturing 
births of plants considered high emitters of PT between 1982 and 1988. Finally, Becker 
(2005) takes a different approach to other firm behavior studies by examining the impact 
of stricter regulations under the CAA on air pollution abatement (APA) capital 
expenditures and operating costs. As the Census Bureau‘s Pollution Abatement Costs 
and Expenditures (PACE) survey data are frequently used as proxies for regulatory 
stringency in firm location studies, the overall purpose of the study was to test whether 
underlying PACE survey responses are correlated with environmental stringency 
measures. Becker (2005) considers four of the CAA‘s criteria air pollutants in a probit 
and tobit model framework. Results from the logit model indicate that generally, heavy 
emitters of the criteria pollutants had a greater likelihood of nonzero APA expenditures. 
Further, results from the tobit model specification show that these heavy emitters are 
faced with APA expenditures in the region of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
 
Overall, recent research examining firm behavior in relation to county-level NAAQS non-
attainment status provides evidence that greater environmental stringency deters births 
of pollution-intensive manufacturers. These results have important policy implications as 
it suggests that federal air quality regulations have unintended consequences stemming 
from the CAA by altering regional capital formation. If environmental regulations are an 
important consideration in pollution-intensive manufacturers‘ site location decisions, this 
may create a spatial browning process as polluting manufacturers are less likely to site 
new plants in areas with increased start-up costs. 
 
The purpose of this research is to use a newly available county-specific data set on 
establishment births to examine the impact of air quality regulation on the location 
decisions of pollution-intensive manufacturing plants across the U.S. Following research 
by Becker and Henderson (2000), List and McHone (2000), and List et al. (2003), we 
are primarily interested in examining the firm location impacts of increased regulatory 
standards with respect to ozone under the CAA. We focus on ozone for three main 
reasons. First, as discussed by List, McHone, and Millimet (2004a), of the six criteria 
pollutants, ozone has attracted the most regulatory attention due to the limited success 
in reducing its concentration levels in the U.S. Second, List and McHone (2000) reason 
that as attainment status for the criteria pollutants can include partial standards between 
attainment and non-attainment, county-level ozone status has been typically polar in 
nature with counties either specifically in- or out-of-attainment. Finally, of all the criteria 
pollutants, more counties have been designated as out-of-attainment with respect to 
ozone emissions. However, to expand the analysis, following Becker (2005), we also 
examine manufacturing firms‘ location behavior with regard to other criteria pollutants. 
In total, we consider four of the six criteria pollutants; ozone, PT, CO, and SO2. County 
nonattainment status effects with regard to NO2 emissions are not tested as there are 
very few counties in a nonattainment status during the studied time period. Also, we do 
not test county nonattainment status effects vis-à-vis airborne lead as county lead 
attainment status was not listed in the Code of Federal Regulations during this time 
period. As Becker (2005) points out, it is also highly unlikely that any counties were in 
non-attainment status with regard to lead emissions, as in May 2004, only a portion of 
three counties were categorized as such. 
 
Our estimates from a fixed effects negative binomial model indicate that the expected 
number of pollution-intensive plant openings decreases by approximately nine percent 
each year that a county is out-of-attainment with respect to ozone standards. As the set-
up costs imposed by the LAER standards significantly detract births of polluting 
manufacturers away from nonattainment counties, we hypothesize that clean births will 
not be impacted by spatial differences in regulation. In terms of ozone attainment status, 
results from a non pollution-intensive model support this hypothesis. Results from 
models examining the impacts of non-attainment status with regard to the other criteria 
pollutants are mixed. We find that county-level non-attainment status with regard to PT 
emissions also deters births of heavy PT-emitting manufacturers but the location 
decisions of high-emitting CO and SO2 plants are not significantly affected by a 
county‘s non-attainment status of the respective pollutant. 
 
2. DATA 
We develop a county-level panel data set on establishment births and deaths from 1996 
to 2000, across all counties in the contiguous United States. The data are collected 
under the Statistics of U.S. Businesses program at the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Establishment data are compared against equivalents from the prior year to discern 
whether the business is new, i.e. a birth, or continuing. The data are verified to ensure 
that businesses that are merely renamed are not counted as new. The births data are 
arranged as inter-year flows, e.g. establishment births between 1996 and 1997. Each 
establishment is coded by geography and industry (Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC)). This provides a level of detail beyond most comparable studies, plus the micro 
level panel data set avoids many of the data constraints and estimation biases apparent 
in previous studies. These studies typically find an insignificant or, at best, marginal 
relationship between environmental regulation stringency and firm location decisions. 
Nonetheless, more recent studies have highlighted the failure of cross-sectional models 
to properly control for the simultaneous nature of firm location and pollution problems 
(c.f. List and McHone, 2000; and Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004). Essentially, cross-
sectional studies consider differences in environmental regulations across counties at 
one point in time. Hence, they do not fully disentangle the positive correlations between 
higher pollution levels and more stringent environmental regulation. As a result, 
coefficient estimates are likely biased. In contrast, the use of panel data allows the 
analysis to consider differences in new firm births in a county over time as a function of 
variation in the county‘s environmental regulation over the same period. As panel 
models can also control for county-specific fixed effects, we are able to overcome the 
limitations of previous cross-sectional studies. 
 
Other advantages of this data set over earlier studies accrue from the micro level data 
on establishment births. For example, due to data limitations, some earlier studies used 
aggregate measures of establishment data and changes in the stock of plants as the 
dependent variable. As environmental regulatory measures based on attainment status 
are more stringent toward new plants locating in the area, use of aggregate plant stock 
data may miss the regulatory effects on the flow of plant births. Our data set exploits 
plant births as a measure of changes in manufacturing establishments, which should 
make our measure more sensitive to changes in environmental regulation at the county 
level. Also, many previous studies employ data from the Census of Manufacturing 
database that is only available every five years (Levinson, 1996; Becker and 
Henderson, 2000; and List, 2001). Therefore, to generate the independent variable, 
plant births are aggregated across five-year intervals. This temporal aggregation of 
births creates potential problems since plants can wind up being omitted from the data 
base entirely as they open and shut down within a given five-year window. 
 
Finally, the data also allow us to analyze the relationship between environmental 
regulation stringency and firm location by pollution-intensity of manufacturing sectors. 
As the county-level attainment status is determined by air-quality measures, we follow 
Greenstone (2002) and List (2004a) by focusing on a set of pollution-intensive industrial 
sectors based on their ozone emission levels. Greenstone (2002) classifies sectors as 
ozone-pollution-intensive if they emit at least 6 percent of the total sector‘s emissions of 
the primary chemical precursors to ozone.1 As establishment data are disaggregated by 
SIC code, we consider plants as being pollution-intensive if they are in the following SIC 
codes: 2611-2631 (Pulp and Paper Mills), 2711-2789 (Printing and Binding), 2812-2819 
(Industrial Inorganic Chemicals), 2911 (Petroleum Refining), 30 (Rubber and Misc. 
Plastics), 32 (Stone, Clay, and  
 
TABLE 1. States with the Highest County-level Non-attainment Status 
 
 
Glass), 3312-3313 (Steel and Electrometallurgical Products), 3321-3325 (Iron and Steel 
Foundries), 34 (Fabricated Metal Products), and 371 (Motor Vehicles and Equipment). 
All other industries are coded as nonpollution-intensive. 
 
We also follow Becker (2005) by examining three other criteria air pollutants: 
particulates (PT), carbon monoxide (CO), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). While Becker (2005) 
examines PACE survey data to investigate the effects of the CAA on plants‘ capital 
expenditures and operating costs, we investigate increased regulatory stringency on 
high emitters of these criteria air pollutants in a more traditional firm location analysis. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides a breakdown of industries considered high emitters 
of PT, CO, and SO2.  
 
With regard to PT, CO, and SO2, we follow Becker (2005) by categorizing high emitters 
based on data from the EPA‘s Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) 
database. AIRS data are also classified by SIC and detail U.S. establishments that emit 
a threshold amount of each of the six criteria air pollutants. For CO, the threshold is set 
at 1,000 tons per year. For all others, it is 100 tons per year. As threshold levels for 
each criteria pollutant are set by the EPA, Becker (2005) calculates the number of 
establishments that emit over the threshold level. An industry (and therefore any plant 
that operates within that industry) is labeled as a high emitter of each pollutant if it has a 
minimum number of plants above the threshold level. In each case, the minimum 
number of establishments was set so that no more than 50 percent of plants were 
designated as a high emitter of any pollutant. 
 
In terms of ozone, there are 325 counties that are designated as out-of-attainment over 
the four-year period (Table 1). The majority of these counties are located in 
Pennsylvania (44), California (27), and Ohio (25). Of the 325 counties, over this time 
frame 68 counties changed status from out-of-attainment to attainment between 1996 
and 2000. For PT, 78 counties were designated as out-of-attainment over the four-year 
period with the majority of counties located in California (11), Colorado (11), and 
Montana (7). Of these counties, only five changed attainment status over this period. 
There were 112 out-of-attainment counties with respect to CO with California (22), New 
Jersey (14), and Colorado (9) contributing most counties. Of these, 47 counties 
changed status during the period. Finally, 45 counties were designated as out-of-
attainment with regard to S02 with the majority of counties located in Minnesota (8), 
Ohio (7), and Indiana (5). Of these, 16 counties changed status between 1996 and 
2000. 
 
Table 2 displays the counties with the greatest number of establishment births by type 
of firm (all births, ozone-polluting, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide). Certain counties 
reappear in each ranking, for example, Los Angeles, New York, and Orange Counties. 
 
Table 3 reports the number of establishment births by pollutant. Particulate-polluting 
establishment births were the most numerous during the four-year period (55,567 
births). Sulfur dioxide-polluting establishment births ranked second in the data (38,115 
births). Ozone-intensive plant births numbered 27,830, and carbon monoxide births 
numbered 24,694. 
 
3. THE MODEL 
Early work by Carlton (1983) and Bartik (1985) employed a conditional logit approach to 
firm level data. This approach works well when the choice set of possible locations is 
relatively small, e.g. counties in a particular state. But it quickly becomes difficult to 
estimate as the choice set expands, e.g. when hundreds of counties are contained in 
the choice set. A solution is proposed by Guimarães et al. (2003) wherein the 
equivalence between the likelihood function of the conditional logit and a Poisson 
regression is exploited for an easy to estimate model irrespective of the number of 
locations in the choice set. 
 
We follow Becker and Henderson (1997, 2000) and List and McHone (2000) in deriving 
the reduced-form model, using a flow concept of new births as the dependent variable, 
allowing the effects of increased stringency in environmental regulation to be captured 
in a partial equilibrium framework. 
 
TABLE 2. Highest Ranking Counties for Establishment Births by Polluting Industry 1996-2000 
 
 
TABLE 3. Establishment Births by Industry 1996-2000 
 
 
The supply of entrepreneurs in any given time period is given by: 
 
(1)    
 
where Yit is the flow of new plants (gross births), Xit are spatial attributes that affect the 
local profit function, Π, and eit is a random error component. The supply curve is 
upward-sloping as an increase in per plant profit induces new births. A demand curve 
represents the change in plant profits due to an increase in births. So we have: 
 
(2)    
 
The demand curve can be positively or negatively sloped as profit can be positively 
affected by births through localization or urbanization economies, or it can be negatively 
affected by births as new plants may have a negative impact on local output price. The 
intersection of the demand and supply functions gives a reduced-form equation: 
 
(3)    
 
where Yit is births in county i in time t; Xit is a vector of county attributes, including 
attainment status and time dummies, presumed to influence the spatial location 
function; and eit is a contemporaneous independently and identically distributed error 
term. 
 
As the dependent variable, new plant births, is a nonnegative integer with a high 
frequency of small numbers, Yit is modeled as a Poisson distributed random variable. 
The probability that a plant will open in county i in time t is given by the basic Poisson 
probability function: 
 
(4)    
 
where λit is the expected value of new plant births and is assumed to be a function of 
the variables specified in the model. Usually, λit takes a log-linear form to ensure 
nonnegative birth counts and may be written as: 
 
(5)    
 
Where β is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated and αi are unobservable 
county-specific factors that may affect the location decision. As αi are important, we 
account for the county-specific unobservables by estimating a fixed effects panel data 
model. In estimation, county-specific unobservables that do not vary over time are 
accounted for in the model as each unit of observation is conditioned on total births for 
that county over the sampling period. As such, the likelihood function becomes: 
 
(6)    
 
The fixed effects, αi, are therefore conditioned out of the likelihood function and are 
unrecoverable. One potentially undesirable characteristic of the Poisson model is the 
restriction that the conditional mean and variance of the dependent variable, λit, are 
equal. This can be a limiting assumption as standard errors from a Poisson model are 
sensitive to under- or overdispersion in the data. As such, the negative binomial model 
is a less restrictive, natural alternative to the Poisson model since it allows for 
differences in the mean and variance. 
 
We gathered data on new plant births for 3,042 counties over the four-year period from 
1996 to 2000. We dropped 126 counties from the model due to missing county-level 
employment and income data. The remaining 2,916 counties generated 11,664 
observations to be used in the panel model. The explanatory variable of interest is 
attainment status under the federal standard for air criteria pollution, which follows 
research by Henderson (1996), Kahn (1997), Becker and Henderson (2000), and List 
and McHone (2000). More specifically, as these studies find significant effects on 
industry behavior vis-à-vis county non-attainment status with respect to their chosen air 
criteria pollutant, we follow Becker (2005) by examining the firm behavioral impacts of 
non-attainment status in relation to criteria air pollutants for four CAAs. As other county-
specific firm location research has used county-specific descriptors, we also include 
county-level population, manufacturing employment, and income as explanatory 
variables since they may influence the firm location decision (see Becker and 
Henderson, 2000; List and McHone, 2000; List, McHone, and Millimet, 2004b). 
Descriptive statistics, definitions, and sources are shown in the Table A2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
Table 4 presents results from the fixed-effects negative binomial models. For the four 
criteria air pollutants considered here, we test the impact of county-level attainment 
status on dirty manufacturing births and nonpolluters. In total we run eight models. We 
are particularly interested in ozone non-attainment status and other location-specific 
effects on high-emitter births (Model 1) due to the relative lack of progress in reducing 
its concentration levels. Also, of all the criteria pollutants, more counties have been 
designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone emissions and there are more 
within-county status changes over the four-year period of our data. 
 
As the underlying assumption within the analysis is that nonpolluting or clean 
manufacturers should not be affected by attainment status, we also examine 
attainment-status effects on clean births. Before discussing the results, some 
preliminary observations are required. First, when estimating, we assume the 
attainment status variable is strictly exogenous; nonetheless, we recognize the potential 
for endogeneity of this variable. That is, new pollution-intensive firm births in year t in 
county i can push the county out of attainment with respect to air quality levels in year t 
+ 1. We follow List and McHone (2000) and empirically check for endogeneity by 
comparing the model results with those using lagged attainment status values. The 
coefficients do not change much, indicating that endogeneity is not a serious issue with 
our general model. Second, for all models we performed the Hausman test to identify 
whether the coefficients estimated by the efficient random-effects estimator are the 
same as the ones 
 
 
TABLE 4. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Model of Births of Clean and Dirty Manufacturers 
 
 
estimated by the consistent fixed-effects estimator. For all models we reject the null 
hypothesis, which suggests that a fixed-effects model is appropriate. Model 1 of Table 5 
presents the affect of ozone attainment on ozone-intensive plant births. The results 
provide some interesting insight into the impact of air quality regulation on firm location 
behavior. For pollution-intensive manufacturers, the results provide evidence that births 
are deterred by increased regulatory costs. Recall, plants locating within counties that 
are designated as being out-of-attainment with regard to the federal standards for ozone 
are subject to the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) on equipment, and this is 
enforced without consideration of cost to the firm. This is in contrast to new plants 
locating within in-attainment counties that are subject to less restrictive start-up costs. 
The coefficient on the attainment status variable is negative and significant at the 10 
percent confidence level. This estimate suggests that the expected number of pollution-
intensive plant openings decreases by approximately 9 percent each year that a county 
is designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone standards. Compared to other 
research, our result is slightly smaller than Henderson‘s (1996) finding in which a 
county‘s out-of-attainment status deters expected births of new plastic manufacturing 
plants by 11 to 12 percent. Based on our results, each county reports 2.2 new ozone 
pollution-intensive plant births each year on average, representing a decrease of 0.19 
expected births per year for counties designated as out-of-attainment with respect to 
ozone standards. This is somewhat smaller than List and McHone‘s (2000) finding that 
non-attainment status decreased the expected flow of dirty manufacturing births by 0.88 
between 1985 and 1990 in New York State. Still, it is in line with the results of List, 
McHone, and Millimet (2004a), which translate the attainment-status parameter in a 
fixed-effects Poisson model into an expected loss of 0.14-0.20 domestically owned new 
plants between 1980 and 1990. The policy implication of our finding is that, as an 
unintended consequence of the CAA 1977, differences in the federal standards for 
ozone may cause a spatial browning process as more stringent air quality regulations 
affect capital flows of pollution-intensive plants. 
 
In terms of the location-specific variables in Model 1, on the demand side, an area‘s 
population positively influences the capital flows to polluting plants. This perhaps 
suggests that firms are attracted to higher populated counties to take advantage of labor 
market economies by sharing a common labor pool. The number of manufacturing 
employees is also positive, albeit insignificant. Higher personal income deters ozone 
pollution-intensive births. While empirical evidence regarding income effects on plant 
births is inconclusive, our result lends support to environmental justice concerns that 
polluting manufacturers locate plants in disproportionately poorer areas. 
 
In Model 2, we examine the relationship between environmental regulatory stringency 
and capital flows of nonpolluting or clean manufacturers. We hypothesize that while the 
LAER on equipment imposes significant private compliance costs on dirty plants, 
environmental stringency should not influence the location decision of clean plants. The 
attainment status is insignificant, suggesting that, in contrast to polluting plants, a 
county‘s ozone attainment status has no impact on the location decision of clean plants. 
This implies that the regulatory costs imposed on new plants locating in out-of-
attainment counties are not a significant component of the location decision for clean 
plants. 
 
We also examine non-attainment status and other location-specific effects vis-à-vis PT, 
CO, and SO2 (Becker 2005). Models 3 and 4 consider the impact of attainment status 
with respect to PT on dirty and clean births respectively. Again the attainment status 
coefficient is negative and significant; counties designated as out-of-attainment with 
regard to PT deter births of manufacturing plants considered to be high emitters of PT. 
While Becker (2005) did not consider location effects, this result lends support to his 
finding that PT non-attainment is more likely to affect capital and operating cost 
expenditures for high-emitting firms. Interestingly, based on Model 4 results, the 
additional expenditures incurred also seem to deter clean births—although the 
coefficient is much smaller. Income is again negative and significant, which suggests 
higher-income areas are less likely to attract PT-producing firms than are low-income 
areas. 
 
While Models 5 and 7 indicate that county-level attainment status in regard to CO and 
SO2 negatively impacts the location behavior of high emitters of the respective criteria 
pollutants, the coefficients are insignificant. This may be due to a relatively low national 
priority toward regulating high emitters of CO and SO2, or perhaps due to the lack of 
within-county attainment changes. This result is consistent with Becker (2005), who also 
finds that nonattainment status with regard to CO has no impact on capital expenditures 
of high emitters and is actually less likely to affect operating costs. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We investigate whether federal air quality standards impact capital flows. Under the 
1977 CAA, new plants locating in counties designated as out-of-attainment of the 
federal standards for six criteria air pollutants face stricter regulations. As the regulation 
is enforced without any cost consideration to the firm, this can impose significant start-
up costs. As such, the intuition is that heterogeneous regulatory stringency could play a 
major role in a firm‘s location decision. While earlier research typically finds an 
insignificant or, at best, a marginal relationship between regulatory standards and 
capital flows, more recent research provides statistical support for this hypothesis. We 
use a newly available panel data set of county-level manufacturing plant births between 
1996 and 2000. The focus of the paper is on ozone attainment effects, since the relative 
lack of progress in reducing the concentration levels of ozone has received much 
attention from regulators of late. Further, our data reveal that more counties have been 
designated as out-of-attainment with respect to ozone emissions and that there are 
many within-county status changes over the four-year period. We find that more-
stringent air-quality regulations with respect to ozone deter births of pollution-intensive 
plants. This supports the idea that asymmetrical spatial environmental standards create 
a spatial browning process. The underlying assumption is that if dirty plants are deterred 
from locating in out-of-attainment counties due to the high start-up costs imposed, 
spatial differences should not influence capital flows to clean plants. Results from a 
second model on non-pollution-intensive manufacturers support this hypothesis, finding 
that attainment status with respect to ozone has no statistical effect on the birth rate of 
clean plant. Finally, we examine the impact of increased regulatory standards with 
respect to PT, CO, and SO2 on dirty and clean births. Our results show that increased 
regulatory standards related to PT deter both high- and low-PT-emitter births in a 
statistically significant fashion. Increased regulatory standards related to high-emitter 
CO or SO2 births are negatively related to establishment births but are not statistically 
significant. 
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